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Abstract: The political economy of the environment aims to deepen our understanding of the
interplay among the economy, the environment, and human well-being. In contrast to
neoclassical environmental economics, it pays attention not only to the net magnitude of costs
and benefits but also to their distribution. In the realm of positive analysis – descriptions of how
the world works – this means exploring the multiple ways in which the distribution of wealth
and power affects environmental outcomes. In the realm of normative analysis – prescriptions
for how the world should work – political economists advocate a range of criteria including not
only cost effectiveness but also safety, sustainability, and environmental justice.

Forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of the Political Economy of the Environment, edited by
Eloi Laurent and Klara Zwickl, 2021.

Political Economy of the Environment: A look back and ahead
Environmental economics extends the purview of economic inquiry beyond items that carry
price tags in markets – the goods and services that count in measuring national income – to
include non-marketed attributes of our natural environment such as clean air, clean water,
biodiversity, and global climate stability. This is founded on growing recognition of the
environment’s crucial role as a source for raw materials and as a sink for the disposal of wastes
generated in economic activities.
If economics is defined as being concerned with the allocation of scarce resources among
competing ends – a common definition found in textbooks – then environmental economics
widens these competing ends to encompass the protection of natural resources and
environmental quality.
Political economy analyzes the allocation of scarce resources not only among competing ends
but also among competing individuals, groups, and classes. The political economy of the
environment extends the purview of environmental economics beyond the allocation of scarce
resources among competing market and non-market ends to their allocation among competing
people.
In analyzing environmental degradation, the political economy of the environment poses three
basic questions:

Ø Who wins? Who benefits from economic activities that degrade the environment? If no
one benefits (or at least thinks they do), these activities would not occur.

Ø Who loses? Who is harmed by environmentally degrading activities? If no one is harmed
in current or future generations, these would not matter from the standpoint of human
well-being.

Ø Who decides? Why can the beneficiaries of these activities impose environmental costs
on the people who are harmed by them?

This analytical framework has both a positive agenda and a normative agenda. The aim of
positive analysis is to describe what happens and why. The aim of normative analysis is to
prescribe what should happen. In both respects, the political economy of the environment
departs from neoclassical economics.
Inequality and the Environment
There are three possible reasons why those who benefit are able to do so by imposing
environmental costs on others. One possibility is that the winners are here today, whereas the
losers are future generations who are not here to defend themselves. The second is imperfect
information: those who are bear the costs may be unaware of the harm or unaware of its
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causes. The third possibility is inequality: those who bear the costs do not have sufficient
purchasing power or political power to prevail in social contests over use and abuse of the
environment.
In the first case, addressing environmental degradation requires an ethic of inter-generational
responsibility on the part of those of us who are alive today. In the second, the remedy is
environmental education, and in particular right-to-know laws that protect the public’s right to
information about environmental harms and who is responsible for them. In the third case, the
solution lies in a redistribution of power.
Power and social decisions
Both purchasing power and political power are implicated in environmental decisions.
Purchasing power underpins the monetary valuation of environmental harms in cost-benefit
analysis, just as it underpins consumer demand in actually existing markets for goods and
services. In cost-benefit analysis, and in markets, each dollar – not each person – counts
equally. Costs and benefits that go to people with more dollars receive greater weight than if
they go to people with less.
Political power matters, too. Decision-makers do not necessarily attach to the same importance
to all benefits and costs as measured by cost-benefit analysts. When the people who are
harmed have no political power, costs imposed upon them can be simply ignored. This is not
merely a hypothetical possibility. It was illustrated in 2017 by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s decision to assign zero value to climate-change impacts outside the United States in
mounting a cost-benefit case to repeal an Obama-era policy that would have curbed carbon
emissions from power plants.1 But even among those who are not excluded entirely from the
political process, power often is distributed quite unequally.
Both sorts of power – purchasing power and political power – tend to be correlated. Those with
more wealth typically wield more political clout, and vice versa. The joint effect can be
described by a power-weighted social decision rule, in which environmental outcomes are
shaped by inequality in the distribution of wealth and influence (Boyce 1994).
Two predictions follow. The first is that the distribution of environmental costs will not be
random. Instead, risks and harm will be inflicted disproportionately on those with less
economic wealth and less political power. The second is that wider inequalities will tend to
result in higher levels of environmental degradation. Both propositions – one on the direction
of environmental costs, the other on their magnitude – have been supported by the growing
body of research on the political economy of the environment carried out in the past quarter
century.
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See Mooney (2017) and Boyce (2018).
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Inequality and the direction of environmental harm
In the United States, environmental justice researchers have documented systematic disparities
in exposure to hazards along the social fault lines of race, ethnicity, and class. AfricanAmericans, Latinos, and low-income communities are more likely to have hazardous facilities
sited in their midst and more likely to face disproportionate exposure to pollution.
One of the earliest studies, by sociologist Robert Bullard (1983), examined the distribution of
hazardous waste sites in Houston, Texas, revealing that they were located primarily in AfricanAmerican neighborhoods. Subsequent research has found similar patterns in many parts of the
country. Multivariate analyses have found that race and ethnicity are strong correlates of
proximity and exposure, even after controlling for neighborhood income; indeed, these are
often a stronger predictor than income.2
Researchers have investigated the direction of causality that underlies these correlations. Are
hazardous facilities sited from the outset in communities with less wealth and power, or do
post-siting demographic changes explain the pattern, as wealthier residents move out, property
values decline, and poorer people move in? Time-series data on hazardous facilities are not
readily available, so few studies have explored this question directly, but those that have done
so have found compelling evidence of disparities in the initial siting decisions.3
Researchers also have begun to explore the economic and health consequences of these
environmental disparities. Disproportionate pollution exposure has adverse effects on children
in particular, resulting in higher rates of infant mortality, lower birthweights, a higher incidence
of neurodevelopmental disabilities, more frequent and intense asthma attacks, and lower
school test scores. And among adults, pollution exposure is linked to lost work-days due to
illness and the need to care for sick children.4 These effects exacerbate the vulnerabilities that
make some communities more susceptible to environmental harm in the first place.
Environmental inequalities are not unique to the United States. In England and the
Netherlands, poorer and more non-white neighborhoods have higher air concentrations of
particulate matter and nitrogen oxides (Fecht et al. 2015). In Delhi, India, a mega-city whose
residents breathe some the world’s dirtiest air, not all are equally exposed: the poor live in
more polluted neighborhoods, they cannot afford air conditioning or air purifiers, and they
spend more time working outdoors where pollution levels are higher, and at the same time
they receive fewer benefits from the power generation, transportation and other activities that
cause the pollution.5
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See Mohai and Saha (2015a); Zwickl et al. (2014); and Bullard et al. (2008).
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See Mohai and Saha (2015b) and Pastor et al. (2001).
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For a brief review of relevant literature, see Boyce et al. (2016).
See Garg (2011); Foster and Kumar (2011); and Kathuria and Khan (2016).
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Although most research on environmental justice has focused on race, ethnicity, and income,
power disparities in other dimensions may have environmental consequences, too. In some
cases, for instance, particularly activities involving resource extraction or solid waste disposal,
rural areas may suffer disproportionate environmental harm compared to urban areas (KellyReif and Wing 2016).
To take another example, gender-based inequalities may translate into disparate
environmental harms inflicted on women. The prime example, perhaps, is the exposure of
women to indoor air pollution – a leading cause of premature mortality worldwide – in places
where solid fuels such as wood, crop residues, and dung are used for cooking, notably south
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.6
The impacts of power disparities can operate across national borders, too, displacing
environmental harm originating in high-income countries onto vulnerable communities in lowincome countries. In a 1992 memorandum, Lawrence Summers, then chief economist at the
World Bank, wrote that ‘the economic logic of dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowestwage country is impeccable.’7 All too often environmental practice follows this script, as
millions of tons of toxic waste are shipped each year from advanced industrialized countries of
the global North to Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Kellenberg 2015).
Inequality and the magnitude of environmental degradation
The impact of inequality on the total magnitude of environmental degradation has received
somewhat less attention from researchers, in part because quantitative analysis has been
hindered by a paucity of the necessary data. Year-to-year variations in inequality and
environmental quality are likely to be small, and the environmental impacts of inequality are
likely to operate on a multi-year time frame, features that render time-series analysis
problematic. Cross-sectional analysis, meanwhile, is complicated by issues of choosing the
appropriate spatial scale and by the need to control for a large number of potentially
confounding variables. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the topic has received growing
attention.
Before turning to the evidence, it is useful to consider why one might expect greater inequality
to lead to more environmental harm. One reason has already been discussed: the
concentration of environmental costs at the lower end of the wealth-and-power spectrum. The
wider the extent of inequality, the less weight these costs receive both in the economic scales
6

See, for example, Okello et al. 2018. Austin and Meija (2017) find that the ratio of female to male premature
deaths from indoor air pollution is inversely related to indicators of women’s status.
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‘Let Them Eat Pollution,’ The Economist, 8 February 1992. The economic logic invoked here is the neoclassical
efficiency criterion as implemented in cost-benefit analysis. ‘The measurement of the costs of health-impairing
pollution depends on the forgone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality,’ Summers argued. ‘From this
point of view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost,
which will be the country with the lowest wages.’ See discussion below.
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of cost-benefit analysis and in the political calculations of public-sector and private-sector
decision makers.
The second reason is the converse of the first: the benefits from environmentally degrading
activities tend to be concentrated at the upper end. The externalization of environmental costs
leads to lower production costs, generating benefits in the form of higher profits for the firm’s
shareholders, higher compensation for its executives, lower prices to consumers of its products,
or a combination of these.8 In general, shareholders and executives occupy relatively high rungs
on the wealth-and-power spectrum. Insofar as the benefits of cost externalization are passed
along to consumers, they accrue in proportion to consumption, benefiting those with the most
purchasing power. The wider the extent of inequality, the more weight these benefits receive in
cost-benefit analysis and in the eyes of decision makers.
Of course, many affluent individuals prefer to live in a clean and safe environment. To a
considerable extent, however, environmental quality is an impure public good in that while not
entirely private, it also is not equally available (or unavailable) to everyone. Relatively wealthy
and powerful people can afford to live in neighborhoods with cleaner air. They also can afford
bottled water, air conditioners, and air purifiers. In the event of illness caused by pollution
exposure, they can obtain better medical care. At the same time, they can more effectively
prevent the siting of environmental hazards in their own neighborhoods. To be sure, they may
not escape the consequences of environmental degradation altogether, but in their private
calculations they balance a relatively small share of the costs against a relatively large share of
the benefits.
In sum, one can expect greater inequality to lead to more environmental degradation by
making it politically easier, as well as more ‘efficient’ by the canons of neoclassical economics,
for those who benefit from it to impose the costs upon others.
Cross-national data on several dimensions of environmental quality became available to
researchers in the early 1990s. One of the first questions that economists used these data to
address was the relationship between environmental degradation and per capita income. In a
well-known study, Grossman and Krueger (1995) analyzed several indicators of air and water
quality and found that pollution tended to rise with per capita incomes up to a turning point, in
the neighborhood of $5,000, after which environmental quality improves. The result was an
inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and environmental degradation that
resembles the curve postulated by Kuznets (1955) on the relationship between per capita
income and income inequality. The new relationship became known as the ‘environmental
Kuznets curve’ (EKC).
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The partitioning of the internal benefits of environmental cost externalization (and, conversely, the costs of
pollution taxes and regulatory compliance) across shareholders, executives, and consumers has received
remarkably little attention from empirical researchers. Theoretical models often assume full pass-through to
consumers, an assumption that seems incongruent with widespread corporate opposition to environmental
policies.
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The EKC appeared to offer an escape from the bleak idea that economic growth is incompatible
with environmental protection. Maybe there are no environmental limits to growth, after all.
Maybe humans are not, as a prominent environmental historian once declared, a ‘cancerous’
species that ‘endangers the larger whole’ (Nash 2001, p. 386). A spirited debate ensued
between some who saw economic growth as the solution to environmental ills and others who
instead saw it as the root disease.
Few noticed that Grossman and Krueger also reported that, in a number of cases, further
growth in per capita income led to a second turning point after which pollution again began to
rise – a result that would seem to bring little comfort to the growth-as-cure school of thought.
Moreover, Grossman and Krueger cautioned that ‘there is nothing at all inevitable about the
relationships that have been observed in the past’ (p. 372).
In a follow-up paper, Grossman and Krueger (1996) observed that policy responses driven by
‘vigilance and advocacy’ on the part of the public are likely to be the main explanation for
improvements in environmental quality. This suggests that the similarity between the EKC and
the original Kuznets curve may not be mere coincidence. If, as Kuznets suggested, there is a
turning point after which inequality falls as per capita income rises, then parallel improvements
in environmental quality may be driven not by per capita income itself but instead by less
inequality.
When proxies for inequality in the distribution of wealth and power were added as possible
determinants of cross-country variations in environmental quality, the results supported the
hypothesis that they are inversely related. Indeed, controlling for proxy variables such as
political rights and civil liberties in many cases caused the EKC relationship between pollution
and per capita income to weaken or disappear.9
Today more cross-national evidence has become available. Researchers have found that greater
inequality is associated with worse environmental performance not only in terms of air and
water pollution, but also in other respects. The proportion of plants and animals threatened
with extirpation or extinction is higher in countries with more unequal income distributions
(Mikkelson et al. 2007, Holland et al. 2010). Rates of deforestation are higher in countries with
higher levels corruption, a variable that can be interpreted as both a cause and a consequence
of inequality (Koyunco and Yilmaz 2009). In upper-income countries, private patents on
environmental innovations and public expenditure on environmental research and
development both are lower in countries with wider income inequality (Vona and Patriarca
2011).
The evidence for adverse environmental effects of inequality generally is strongest for variables
that have immediate impacts on human health, including air and water pollution, as one might
expect (Cushing et al. 2015). For environmental impacts that are widely dispersed across time
and space, the evidence is more mixed. Recent studies nevertheless have reported evidence of
9

See Torras and Boyce (1998), Harbaugh et al. (2002), Neumayer (2002), and Farzin and Bond (2006).
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an inverse relationship between inequality and carbon dioxide emissions (Knight et al. 2017,
McGee and Greiner 2018). Part of the explanation may be that fossil fuel combustion also
generates conventional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, that trigger
public demands for emission reductions.
Inter-state studies have found evidence that inequality adversely effects environmental
outcomes within the U.S. States with more unequal distributions of power tend to have weaker
environmental policies, leading to greater environmental stress and worse public health
outcomes (Boyce et al. 1999). Inter-state differences in inequality also have been found to be
correlated with carbon dioxide emissions (Jorgenson et al. 2017).
Taking metropolitan areas as the unit of observation, Morello-Frosch and Jesdale (2006) found
that in the U.S. cities with more residential segregation by race and ethnicity tend to have
higher cancer risks from air pollution for all population groups. Similarly, Ash et al. (2013) found
that in metropolitan areas that rank highest in terms of racial and ethnic disparities in industrial
air pollution exposure, average exposure levels are higher for Anglo whites, too, implying that
that environmental justice can be ‘good for white folks.’
The implication of all these studies is that protecting the environment and reducing inequality
can and should be complementary goals. With lower levels of inequality, the public is better
able protect the air, water, and natural resources on which human well-being depends.
Normative Issues
Policy prescriptions invariably rest on normative criteria, the explicit or implicit ethical
principles by which we assess alternative courses of action and states of the world as better or
worse. Neoclassical economics invokes one overriding criterion for this purpose – efficiency –
and neoclassical environmental economists have invested a great deal of time and effort in
trying to operationalize this for policy making purposes. Political economists often invoke other
criteria, including safety, sustainability, and justice. How best to operationalize these, and how
to combine them, are key issues yet to be fully resolved.
Efficiency
The term ‘efficiency,’ as deployed in neoclassical economics, refers to something more than
cost-effectiveness. In everyday speech, these notions are often used as synonyms. When we
speak, for example, of the most efficient way to the most efficient way to travel from point A to
point B, we are really talking about cost-effectiveness, the lowest-cost means to achieve this
end. But when neoclassical economists speak of efficiency, they are not only referring to
decisions about the means, but also how to choose the ends themselves, asking for example
whether it is desirable to travel from A to B at all.
Cost effectiveness can be applied to the pursuit of ends chosen on the basis of any of the
criteria mentioned above. For example, policy makers may use a safety criterion to decide upon
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air quality standards, and then try to choose the most cost-effective ways of attaining the
safety objective. In invoking efficiency to choose the standards themselves, neoclassical
economics goes considerably further, requiring the policy maker to put a monetary value on
protecting public health and saving human lives, and to weigh this against the costs of doing so
in order to decide on the ‘efficient’ level of clean air.
In theory, neoclassical efficiency is based on a seemingly non-controversial idea: ‘Pareto
optimality,’ the proposition that an optimal state of the world is one where no individual can be
made better off without making someone else worse off.10 Because it is silent when it comes to
how the economic pie should be distributed, there are innumerable outcomes that could
qualify as Pareto optimal. Even if saving the life of an impoverished child at the cost of one
dollar to a millionaire, strict Pareto optimality offers no grounds for advocating it, because the
millionaire would be made fractionally worse off. Efficiency in this sense of the term amounts
to saying that twenty-dollar bills should not be left lying on the ground. As a basis for policy
making it has little cutting power, since just about any policy, even one that makes very many
people very much better off, will make someone at least somewhat worse off.
To escape from this prescriptive cul-de-sac and arrive at a more practical basis for its policy
prescriptions, neoclassical economics replaces strict Pareto optimality with a more flexible
criterion, that of a ‘potential Pareto improvement.’ One state of the world can now be judged
preferable to another one if those who are made better off could, in theory, compensate those
who are made worse off, and still come out ahead. Whether compensation is really paid is
shrugged off as a distributional issue that is extraneous to making a policy prescription based
on efficiency. By this sleight of hand, the policy goal becomes simply the biggest economic pie,
its size being measured by its monetary value, regardless of how the pie is sliced. In
macroeconomics this translates into maximizing GDP. In microeconomics it translates into
maximizing net benefits, calculated by the tools of cost-benefit analysis.
Economists have devised a number of quasi-ingenious methods to assign monetary values to
things without a market price tag, from the value of a statistical life (meaning the value of
avoiding a risk of premature death) to the value of endangered species, clean air, and climate
stability. Mostly these methods rest on willingness to pay: how much would people in a given
population be willing to pay to reduce their risk of premature death, save the whales, and so
on. Just as in real markets, individual preferences count insofar as they are backed by ability of
to pay. In markets for food, hunger generates effective demand only if it is backed by
purchasing power. So, too, in the shadow markets of cost-benefit analysis, the value of a clean
and safe environment rests not only on what people desire but also on what they can pay for
it.11
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Controversy can arise, however, when adherence to the Pareto criterion violates with other norms, such as
liberty. See, for example, Sen (1987).
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It is sometimes claimed that in focusing only on the size of the economic pie, neoclassical efficiency is neutral
regarding how pie is distributed. This is not strictly true. The prices used to measure the size of the pie reflect the
distribution of purchasing power. If, for example, income were reallocated from rich to poor, demand for rice and
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The result is encapsulated in the memorandum by World Bank chief economist Lawrence
Summers, maintaining that toxic waste should be dumped in the country with the lowest
wages. ‘The arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution in LDCs [less developed
countries],’ Summers concluded, citing ‘intrinsic rights to certain goods’ and ‘moral reasons’ as
examples of such arguments, ‘could be turned around and used more or less effectively against
every Bank proposal for liberalization.’12 Or, one might add, against any policy prescription
based exclusively on the normative criterion of neoclassical efficiency.
Safety
Existing environmental laws and policies often rest on a quite different normative foundation:
safety. In the United States, for example, the Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection
Agency to establish air quality standards for ‘the protection of public health and welfare’ while
‘allowing an adequate margin of safety’ – not to decide on standards by weighing the benefits
of protecting public health against its costs.13 In such a world, economists play a more modest
role. They can recommend how to pursue the objective most cost-effectively, but it is not their
job to decide on the objective itself.
Safety is generally a matter of degree, so there is often some arbitrariness in deciding what
qualifies as ‘safe.’ In practice, environmental policy makers often follow a rule of thumb, such
as defining the acceptable risk from pollution as adverse health impacts on 1 in 10,000 people,
or 1 in 100,000, in a given year.14 Similarly, in international climate policy, the Paris
Agreement’s goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C is
based on scientific assessments as to what is safe, rather than judgments by neoclassical
economists as to what is efficient.15
The ethical underpinning for the safety criterion is the principle that everyone has the right to
live in a clean and safe environment. In many countries, this right is enshrined in the most
fundamental of legal documents, the national constitution. The post-apartheid Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa mandates, for example, that ‘every person shall have the right to
beans would go up, and demand for champagne and caviar would go down, changing their prices and thereby
altering the ‘efficient’ composition of output.
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‘Let Them Eat Pollution,’ The Economist, 8 February 1992.
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42 U.S. Code § 7409 - National primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, section (b)(1).
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For discussion, see Kutlar Joss et al. (2017); Hunter and Fewtrell (2001).
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For discussion, see Schleussner et al. (2016). For a comparison of very different carbon price recommendations
based on the criteria of safety and neoclassical efficiency, see Chapter [xx] in this volume. [Note to editors: Insert
reference to my chapter on carbon pricing.]

10
an environment that is not detrimental to his or her health or well-being.’16 Insofar as rights are
held equally by all, the safety criterion provides a far more egalitarian basis for environmental
policy than willingness to pay.
The economics of implementing the safety criterion are relatively straightforward. All that is
required is an assessment of the costs of alternative means of meeting the standard, as
opposed to the calculation and comparison of the benefits and costs of a wide range of
possibilities.
One conceptual issue that worth considering, however, is the difference between saying that
each individual enjoys an equal right to risk mitigation and saying that each statistical life
counts equally. In the latter case, the same level of risk to an individual – for example, from air
pollution – would carry more weight in densely populated areas than in sparsely populated
areas simply because more people are impacted in the former. In other words, paraphrasing
Summers, by this logic a load of toxic waste should be dumped in the location with the lowest
population density. To be sure, few would advocate siting a nuclear waste dump in proximity to
a major population center. But from the perspective of individual rights, what is deemed safe
should not vary depending on whether one lives in the city or the countryside.
Sustainability
The ethical underpinning for the sustainability criterion is intergenerational equity. Often this is
translated into the goal of ensuring that the well-being of future generations is no less than that
of the present generation. The Brundtland Commission in 1987 expressed idea this in turns of
human needs: sustainable development ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment
and Development 1987, p. 8). Alternatively, sustainability is sometimes defined in terms of a
non-decreasing stock of natural capital or of total natural and human-made capital (called
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sustainability, respectively).
The sustainability criterion departs markedly from neoclassical efficiency, where the well-being
of future generations is handled by discounting future costs and benefits to obtain their
‘present values.’ With a fairly modest discount rate of four percent, for example, a $100 million
cost (in today’s dollars) to be incurred 100 years from now is valued at only $2 million today. In
other words, it would be inefficient for the present generation to spend more than $2 million in
order to avoid this cost on behalf of future generations.
Private firms often use discounted cash flow analysis to make investment decisions, since
money has ‘time value’ by virtue of its potential earning capacity. Individuals also exhibit ‘time
preference’ in their decisions, valuing a dollar today more than the same dollar a year or more
hence. Inequalities of wealth and power may increase the discount rates used in private
16

For other examples, see Popovic (1996).
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decisions, further devaluing the well-being of future generations. Among the very poor, the
imperatives of day-to-day survival may become so pressing as to overshadow concerns about
tomorrow. Among the very rich, fear that popular discontent will one day dislodge them from
their privileged positions may encourage a cut-and-run strategy for natural resource
management, exemplified by the rapacious deforestation across much of Southeast Asia in the
1960s and 1970s under the rule of dictators like Marcos in the Philippines.17
Neoclassical cost-benefit analysis elevates discounting from a private calculus into an ethical
principle for public policy decisions that will impact future generations. The effect of discount
rates is to count their well-being for less – often stunningly less – than our own. One rationale
proffered for this seemingly callous stance is the belief that human well-being is on an upward
escalator that inexorably rises over time. Citing a forecast that global per capita income will
grow from about $10,000 today to roughly $130,000 (in today’s dollars) in the next two
centuries, climate economist (and future Nobel laureate) William Nordhaus argued, for
example, that ‘while there are plausible reasons to act quickly on climate change, the need to
redistribute to a wealthy future does not seem to be one of them’ (Nordhaus 2008). Yet one
might think that climate change itself would be enough to cast a rather large shadow over the
comforting assumption of a dramatically wealthier future for humankind.
In effect, the sustainability criterion imposes a constraint on decision makers today. Efforts to
translate this into an operational criterion pose several questions, however. What, precisely, is
to be sustained? How should it be measured? Is human-made capital, for example, a good
substitute for natural capital? Even if we adopt a stringent constraint such as maintaining the
stock of natural capital, how do we combine diverse resources like clean air, clean water,
minerals, and biodiversity into one measure? Instead of trying to come up with a single metric,
should we measure sustainability as a multi-variable vector?18 Why should we take today’s
levels as a benchmark? If human well-being, or the stock of capital, grows or declines over time,
does the threshold for sustainability rise or fall with them? These practical issues may be no
more (or less) insuperable than the monetary valuations required to operationalize the
neoclassical efficiency criterion, but to date they have received relatively little attention.
Justice
Justice is often regarded as a central normative goal in the political economy of the
environment. The distribution of environmental costs and benefits is important not only
because of what it tells us about how the world works, but also because justice is a compelling
end in itself.
Whereas sustainability addresses intergenerational equity, justice addresses intragenerational
equity. While neoclassical efficiency focuses on the size of the pie, justice focuses on how it is
17
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sliced. Whereas the safety criterion aims to protect public health, justice seeks to ensure that
environmental health – whatever its level – is distributed fairly across the population.
Environmental justice most often refers to equity across subgroups of the population defined
on the basis of race, ethnicity, income, gender, or other attributes. As discussed above, a large
body of evidence has found systematic environmental disparities to exist, with disproportionate
costs imposed on certain racial and ethnic groups, on low-income communities, and in some
cases on women.
An alternative approach is to rank the whole population by the environmental attribute in
question – exposure to air pollution, for example – and compute a distributional measure such
as the Gini coefficient to assess the extent of disparity. This vertical measure of inequality has
been applied to environmental quality much less often than horizontal (inter-group) measures,
but it, too, may be regarded as salient to environmental justice.19 Rather than relying on a
single measure of justice, an alternative approach could be treat it as a vector of variables
encompassing both horizontal and vertical equity.20
As a normative goal, justice requires the reduction or elimination of environmental disparities.
In principle, this could be achieved either by reducing pollution and resource depletion in
overburdened communities or by increasing them in less burdened communities. The latter
possibility has led some critics to accuse environmental justice advocates of ‘Nimbyism,’ the
‘not-in-my-back-yard’ ethic that contributed to the environmental disparities in the first place.
In response, proponents have countered that their ultimate goal is ‘Not in anybody’s back yard,’
a formulation close to the safety criterion.
In implementing the justice criterion, two additional issues warrant mention. The first is how to
aggregate across diverse dimensions of environmental quality. There is an important difference,
for example, between a situation where one type of pollution is concentrated in one
community and another type in another community, versus a scenario in which both are
concentrated in the same community. The theoretical and empirical literature on
environmental justice suggests that the latter situation is quite common, but the extent to
which different environmental impacts offset each other across communities, as opposed to
being additional or perhaps even multiplicative, deserves more attention.
The second issue involves spatial scale. Two adjacent locations each many have an equitable
distributions of environmental costs within them, but a highly inequitable distribution between
them. This means that if combined into a single spatial unit – as we move, for example, from a
subnational to the national scale – the measured extent of environmental inequality may
19
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In this approach, environmental justice could be defined in terms of an n+1 dimensional vector, where n = the
number of horizontal differentiations on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, region, or other attributes, with one
measure of vertical inequality added.
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change rather dramatically. This is particularly relevant to environmental justice on a global
scale. If highly polluting production processes are shifted offshore from North America to Asia,
or from western Europe to eastern Europe, for example, this could diminish environmental
disparities within countries while exacerbating them internationally.21
Multiple criteria and incomplete orderings
The four criteria discussed above – efficiency, safety, sustainability, and justice – offer distinct
normative bases for evaluating outcomes and prescribing policies. In some cases they will lead
to divergent conclusions, but in others they may lead to the same results.
In fact, there may be a substantial degree of compatibility among safety, sustainability, and
justice, the alternatives to neoclassical efficiency that are favored by political economists.22
Higher levels of environmental degradation that are linked to wider disparities of wealth and
power are likely to contradict all three normative goals. And at least in cases where these
outcomes reflect disparities in political power, rather than simply disparities in purchasing
power, they may contradict neoclassical efficiency, too.23
Multiple-criteria decision analysis offers an alternative to relying solely on one criterion or
another. When rankings across alternative outcomes coincide across all criteria, decision
making is relatively easy. In cases where they diverge, the result is an incomplete ordering.24
Rather than sweeping these different conclusions under the rug by relying on one criterion
alone, or by collapsing multiple criteria into a single metric, the best course of action may be to
acknowledge this reality and debate the best course of action accordingly.
Concluding Remarks
The political economy of the environment aims to deepen our understanding of the interplay
among the economy, the environment, and human well-being. In contrast to neoclassical
environmental economics, it pays attention not only to the net magnitude of costs and benefits
but also to their distribution.
In the realm of positive analysis – descriptions of how the world works – this means exploring
the multiple ways in which the distribution of wealth and power affects environmental

21

Studies of pollution offshoring have reached mixed conclusions; see, for example, Li and Zhou (2017),
Cherniwchan et al. (2017), and Brunel (2017).
22

For further discussion of the mutually reinforcing links between sustainability and justice, see Laurent (2019).

23

For discussion of the relationship between environmental injustice and efficiency, see Glasgow (2005). For a
discussion of tradeoffs and compatibilities across criteria applied to urban development, see Kremer et al. (2019).
24

See Sen (2004) for a discussion of alternative approaches to incompleteness.
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outcomes. The political economy of the environment posits that our relationships with nature
are tied intimately to our relationships with each other.
Research has demonstrated that the costs of environmental degradation do not fall randomly
across the population. ‘Negative externalities,’ as these are called in neoclassical economics,
are not impersonal side effects of economic activities. Instead, their dispersion maps that of
purchasing power and political power. More research is needed to better understand the
dynamics behind this and the reasons for variations in the patterns and extent of disparities
across time and space.
Research also has supported the hypothesis that inequalities affect the overall magnitude of
environmental degradation, as well as the distribution of the resulting costs and benefits. This
would imply that the goals of protecting the environment and working for a more equitable
distribution of wealth and power are complementary. Again, more research is needed to better
understand the nature and strength of these effects across the multiple dimensions of
environmental quality.
In the realm of normative analysis – prescriptions for how the world should work – political
economists advocate a wider range of criteria for decision making decisions than relying solely
on neoclassical efficiency, defined as the maximization of net benefits regardless of their
distribution. This does not mean that political economists regard the overall magnitude of net
benefits as unimportant, but simply that they do not regard this as the only gauge by which
outcomes should be measured and compared. Nor does it mean that political economists are
unwilling to consider cost effectiveness in deciding on the means to pursue environmental
ends, however the ends are chosen.
Safety, sustainability, and justice are the alternative criteria that political economists invoke for
evaluating environmental outcomes and recommending policies. More research is needed to
operationalize these fully for the policy-making purposes. And more research is needed to
explore how multiple criteria can be brought to bear on decision-making processes.
In sum, the political economy of the environment deals with some of the most urgent questions
of our time, yet as a field of inquiry and research it is still at a fairly early stage of development.
There is ample room for important work to be done.
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